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LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS?  
REFLECTIONS ON ELEONORE STUMP’S THEODICY
William Hasker
Eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
is a major contribution to the literature on the problem of evil. This review 
essay summarizes the overall argument of the book, pointing out both mer-
its and difficulties with Stump’s approach. In particular, the essay urges ob-
jections to the solution she presents for the problem of suffering.
Seven years in the writing, and many more years in preparation, Eleonore 
Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering1 is a book 
that is both massive and masterful. The work deploys an extraordinary 
range of resources: philosophy, theology, and scripture, but also psychology 
and neuroscience as well as a multitude of references from biography and 
literature. Given this wealth of material, a critical comment such as this one 
must of necessity be highly selective. I will proceed by way of a brief sum-
mary and comment on each of the four main sections of the book.
I. Task and Method
What is needed, Stump says, is a justification for God’s allowing suffer-
ing. This question has often been addressed by means of theodicies, and 
Stump spends some time discussing the theodicy project. She addresses 
quite effectively the objections that have become current to the very idea 
of theodicy. One important objection, urged by Terence Tilley among oth-
ers, is that “theodicies are immoral because they blind us to the horror of 
evil, and they make us comfortable with suffering we might otherwise 
strive against” (16). Let it be said once and for all: Stump is not vulnerable 
to this charge. She writes with passionate eloquence about the severity 
of human suffering, and she never lets us forget the awfulness of that for 
which we are seeking a justifi cation. Her search for a solution to the prob-
lem is energized precisely by her sense of the great evils involved in the 
suffering that, nevertheless, God permits.2 One may disagree with some 
1Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010. Page references are to this volume.
2Later on she states, “Human suffering is appalling, and the horror of the whole of it 
has to be faced. But there is more than one way of facing suffering, and consigning those 
who suffer to the scrapheap of human history is not the only way to respect their suffer-
ing” (456).
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or all of the solu tions she proffers, but the charge of minimizing or evad-
ing the reality of evil gains no purchase against her.
Having thus defended the propriety of theodicy, she takes an apparent 
step backwards and states that her own project is, strictly speaking, not a 
theodicy but a defense. Now the distinction between theodicy and defense 
has become common since it was introduced by Plantinga, but as yet there 
is no single, generally recognized explication of the difference between the 
two. She states that she is “construing ‘defense’ roughly in Plantinga’s and 
Van Inwagen’s way” (491n), but this fails to clarify matters, because the two 
men actually have somewhat different under stand ings of the notion. So 
we must look for clarification to what Stump herself says about it. In some 
respects, her explanations are clear enough. A theodicy presents to us a 
view of the world which elucidates the general nature of God’s reasons 
for permitting suffering to occur, and claims that this is the way the world 
actually is. (This need not and should not involve a claim to discern the 
reasons for particular instances of suffering, which in many cases are un-
avoidably obscure to us.) A defense, however, presents to us a picture of a 
possible world in which God has adequate reasons for permitting the sorts 
of suffering that occur in our world, but does not include the claim that 
this possible world is our actual world. That is to say, it presents possible 
morally sufficient reasons for God’s permitting evil, but makes no claim 
that these are the actual reasons. Even an atheist, then, may be able to admit 
that a given defense is successful—that is, she may admit that if there were 
a God, the sorts of considerations adduced might explain how God could 
permit evils without being morally compromised thereby. A defense does 
not, however, include the assertion that the world thus described is not the 
actual world, so it is open to a believer to conclude that the world of the 
defense is actual and that the reasons given in it are really God’s reasons.3
So far this is clear enough. An ambiguity arises, however, when we 
ask: what are the epistemic requirements for a successful defense? Is it 
required only that the world of the defense be logically possible? If so, 
then the defense will be successful only against the charge that God and 
evil are logically incompatible, and that is a charge that is seldom pressed 
3For several reasons, I find this way of explicating the difference less than satisfactory. 
There is the epistemic ambiguity that is discussed below in the text. There is also a practi-
cal difficulty, in that these definitions will tend to have the result of eliminating theodicy: 
philosophers will tend to avoid making the more ambitious claim, to have discerned God’s 
actual reasons, when the more cautious project of defense offers almost all of the same 
benefits. I do not believe that a theodicy needs to claim to have identified the actual reasons 
for which God permits evils: we should always leave open the possibility that God has 
other, and better, reasons for what he does than any we have been able to think of. On my 
preferred account, van Inwagen-type defenses are counted as tentative proposals for theo-
dicy. The term ‘defense’ is reserved for arguments which purport to defeat this or that ar-
gument from evil without offering a proposal concerning God’s reasons. Examples include 
Plantinga’s free will defense, Plantinga’s argument against the feasibility of a probabilistic 
argument from evil, the skeptical theist defense, and my own “necessity-of-gratuitous-
evils” defense. For discussion, see my Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 23–26, and The Triumph of God Over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2008), 16–21, 187–198.
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these days. If on the other hand stronger epistemic requirements are im-
posed, the criterion of plausibility becomes important, and the distance 
between defense and theodicy narrows considerably. (What must be 
evaluated, of course, is whether the defense is plausible given the truth of 
theism—that is, of the particular variety of theism that is being defended.)
Now van Inwagen seems to opt for a fairly strong epistemic requirement; 
he describes a defense as “a story according to which God and suffering of 
the sort contained in the actual world both exist, and which is such that 
(given the existence of God) there is no reason to think it false.”4 Stump, how-
ever, has in mind a weaker requirement: she states that for a defense to be 
successful
it has to be the case that, for all we know5 (as distinct from all that we are 
committed to believing), the claims of a defense could be true. It would there-
fore invalidate a defense if something about what we currently know dem-
onstrates that the possible world of the defense is not the actual world. (454)
If ‘know’ and ‘demonstrate’ are taken strictly here, as they must be, the 
requirement comes down to this: there must not be a valid deductive ar-
gument from uncontested premises to the falsity of the statements made 
in the defense.6 Now such demonstrations, whether of truth or of falsity, 
are very seldom available for wide-ranging philosophical claims such as 
those involved in a defense against the problem of suffering. It follows 
that if such a demonstration is required to invalidate a defense, then the 
epistemic requirements for a successful defense are really quite weak—
but this means that the force of the defense itself will be correspondingly 
weak. If no more than this is being claimed, one might wonder whether 
the claim is significant enough to warrant much critical attention.
This cannot, however, be the whole story. Stump also states that if the 
biblical narratives discussed in her book “are in fact divinely revealed 
truth, then the defense based on those narratives will also be a theodicy. 
There is nothing to keep readers committed to the belief that the biblical 
texts are God’s revelation from taking the defense I construct as a theod-
icy” (35). Stump herself is committed to the view that the texts are God’s 
revelation, so it seems clear that she also views her defense as a theodicy, 
even though that is not the conclusion for which she explicitly argues in 
4From van Inwagen’s “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Si-
lence,” 156 (my emphasis); cited by Stump on 19. It is worth pointing out that this explica-
tion of ‘defense’ may very well exclude the paradigmatic instance, Plantinga’s free will 
defense. One could consider the free will defense to be successful, even if one thought it 
extreme ly improbable that everyone, or indeed that anyone, actually suffers from trans-
world depravity. (I suppose that for Roman Catholics the idea that the virgin Mary was 
transworldly depraved is actually heretical!)
5The “for all we know” locution is also employed by van Inwagen, and I believe it tends 
to encourage the sort of epistemic ambiguity noted in the text. If ‘know’ is taken strictly, the 
requirement is rather weak, but the phrase is easily taken as indicating that, as in the quota-
tion here, we have no reason for thinking the assertions to be false, which is a much stronger claim.
6Later on Stump says, “Because it is a defense and not a theodicy, [my proposal] needs only 
to be internally consistent and not incompatible with uncontested empirical evidence” (452).
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the book. But if the defense is viewed in that light, broad considerations of 
probability and plausibility come into play, considerations that are appar-
ently excluded if we consider only the “demonstrations of falsity” referred 
to in the preceding paragraph.
Given this somewhat unclear situation, a decision on the part of the re-
viewer is called for. I submit that for a defense (in Stump’s sense) to be suc-
cessful, the epistemic requirement set by van Inwagen needs to be met. That 
is, it must be the case that, given the existence of God, we do not have rea-
son to think that the assertions made in the defense are false. (If we do have 
good reason to think them false, we cannot responsibly urge the defense 
as showing how, in our actual world, God could be justified for permitting 
suffering.) But if we have that much, the defense is at least a candidate for 
being a theodicy, a true account of the reasons that God is justi fied in per-
mitting suffering. For purposes of this essay, then, Stump’s defense will be 
viewed as a proposal for a theodicy—as a claim, albeit a tentative one, about 
what is actually the case in the world and about what may be God’s reasons 
for permitting suffering.7 I do not believe this distorts her intention, even 
though her official position is limited to the less ambitious claim.
The remainder of the first part is devoted to method; primarily, to justi-
fying the use Stump intends to make of narratives. She discusses at some 
length the ways in which narratives have been used in philosophy, and 
argues that these approaches can legitimately be applied to biblical nar-
ratives. The main function of narratives in her approach, it turns out, is 
that they provide a way of accessing “Franciscan knowledge.” Franciscan 
knowledge is contrasted with Dominican knowledge, so named in vir-
tue of what is known of the personalities of those two medieval saints. 
Dominican knowledge is organized, precise, propositional knowledge—
the sort of knowledge analytic philosophy excels in presenting and pro-
cessing. Franciscan knowledge, by contrast, is knowledge by immediate 
experience, knowledge which, Stump argues, often cannot be translated 
into propositional form. In a classic argument Frank Jackson described 
Mary, a neuroscientist
who knows everything there is to know about the brain, including every-
thing there is to know about the way in which the brain processes color, 
but who has had no perceptual experience of color of any sort because from 
birth she has been isolated (by some suitable villain) in a black-and-white 
environment. Although, in her imprisonment, she knew all there was to 
know about the neurobiology of color perception, it seems clear that she 
will come to know something new when she finally perceives color. (50)
In an inspired move, Stump modifies the thought-experiment:
Imagine then that Mary in her imprisonment has had access to any and all 
information about the world as long as that information is only in the form 
of third-person accounts giving her knowledge that. Mary has available  
7Thus, the reference in the title to “Stump’s theodicy.”
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to her the best science texts for any of the sciences, from physics to soci-
ology. She knows that there are other people in the world, and (mirabile 
dictu) she knows all that science can teach her about them. But she has 
never had any personal interactions of an unmediated and direct sort 
with another person. . . . And then suppose that Mary is finally rescued 
from her imprisonment and united for the first time with her mother, who 
loves her deeply.
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that 
Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew every-
thing about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative 
propositional form, including her mother’s psychological states. Although 
Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is unit-
ed with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. (52)
Mary’s newly discovered knowledge of her mother exemplifies an espe-
cially important form of Franciscan knowledge, the knowledge that is 
gained through “second-person experience” of another person. (Here we 
have echoes of Martin Buber’s “I-Thou” relationship.) The impor tance of 
narrative here is that it can impart to us something similar to this even in 
the absence of direct contact with the person known. Thus, in reading a 
novel we may “come to know” the persons portrayed, may come to have 
a sense of the heroine, say, as a person. Stump contends that in this way 
the injection of narrative can counter what many have complained of as 
the “aridity” and “narrowness” of analytic philosophy. (Stump identifies 
herself as an analytic philosopher.) This Franciscan knowledge is what 
Stump wants us to get from her biblical narratives—and also, not so inci-
dentally, from the numerous other stories that make cameo appearances 
in the various chapters of her book.
II. Worldview
The second main section sets out selected aspects of the worldview that 
is assumed to be true in the world of Stump’s defense. Not surprisingly, 
the worldview in question is that of the arch-Dominican, Thomas Aquinas. 
First to be considered is the nature of love, which according to Aquinas has 
two components: a desire for the good of the beloved, and a desire for union 
with the beloved. Union, however, can take various forms, depending on 
the different kinds of relationship between lover and beloved; Stump terms 
these kinds of relationship the “offices of love.” She analyzes what it means 
for one person to be present to another and for one person to be close to 
another. She then turns to the “willed loneliness” which is an important 
component in the fallen state of human beings, a loneliness which, to the 
extent it prevails, shuts out from one’s life other human beings and even 
God. In a chapter entitled “Other-Worldly Redemption” she describes the 
divine solution to this loneliness in the form of sanctification and justifica-
tion; in the process, she details her own version of the Thomistic solution to 
the problems of grace and free will.
All this is done with care and insight that can hardly even be suggested 
in a brief discus sion such as this one. We cannot forget, to be sure, that this 
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is Stump’s version of Aquinas, one that may at points disagree with other 
readings of that notoriously controversial figure. Stump’s Aquinas is of 
course a libertarian, unlike some other interpretations of his thought. More 
surprising is the virtual disappearance of some of the divine attributes 
traditionally associated with Aquinas. I found nowhere in the book any 
mention of divine timeless eternity. Her descriptions of the relationships 
between God and human beings are highly personalistic and interactive—
and also temporal. No doubt it would be possible to redescribe these rela-
tionships in a way that is consistent with divine timelessness. But Stump 
apparently did not think it would be advantageous to her project to do so; 
indeed, this might have interfered with the sense of such relationships she 
was trying to communicate. There is also an interesting twist with regard 
to divine impassibility. On her analysis of closeness between persons, for a 
human being, Paula, to be close to God requires that God be vulnerable to 
Paula. Stump is aware of the discomfort this may cause to some, but argues 
that such a response would be mistaken:
But what about the condition having to do with vulnerability? On the 
Thomistic conception of God as sovereign and ultimately self-sufficient, it 
certainly looks as if . . . it is not possible for God to be vulnerable to human 
beings. But these appearances are mistaken, too. According to a biblical 
text that Aquinas accepts as literally true, God wants all human beings to 
be saved, but, on a Christian doctrine Aquinas also accepts, not all human 
beings are saved. . . . Because God gave human beings . . . free will, God 
allowed certain things that matter to God—the salvation of all human be-
ings—to depend on wills other than God’s own. In this sense, God makes 
himself vulnerable to human beings. (123)
The traditional doctrine of divine providence as all-controlling has to go 
as well. Stump’s Aquinas is not only a libertarian; he also rejects divine 
middle knowledge and accepts that God takes risks in his providential 
governance of the world:
Maybe God does not play dice with the universe; but perhaps, like a con-
summate chess master, through the application of great intelligence, he is 
able to get to ends he wants through myriad possible disjunctive roads to 
it. (226)
It will be left to other scholars of Aquinas to pass judgment on the attribution 
to him of views such as these. I do want to say, however, that in the depiction 
in these pages of God and God’s interactions with his creatures there is very 
little that cannot be endorsed by the proponents of open theism.8 I say this 
by way of compliment and appreciation for Stump’s views, but I am aware 
that some may react less favorably!
8Without doubt Stump’s Aquinas does hold that God is timelessly eternal, even if that 
is not said here, and possesses timeless knowledge of all that transpires in time, including 
what for us lies still in the future. But Stump seems on the whole to recognize that such 
timeless know ledge of the future (without middle knowledge) makes no difference for di-
vine providence and is in fact providentially useless.
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III. Narratives
The third, and longest, section of the book is devoted to the biblical narra-
tives which are to furnish the materials for the theodicy/defense presented 
in the final section. A lengthy chapter each is devoted to Stump’s comments 
on the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany. It is clear that 
she has pondered long and deeply over these narratives, and her comments 
are largely based on these reflections rather than on the sorts of detailed lin-
guistic considerations that are predominant in conventional commentaries. 
In the hands of a sensitive and imaginative commentator such as Stump, 
such a procedure can yield invaluable insights, and that is very much the 
case here.9 However, the procedure also makes possible the intrusion of 
subjective ideas that are not implied in the text and at times may even run 
counter to the text. I believe this does occur in Stump’s commen taries, 
though not in the same way or to the same degree in all of the chapters.
One could, to be sure, take the position that this does not matter. Stump 
has pointed out that, for purposes of a defense against the problem of suf-
fering, a fictional narrative could serve just as well as a historical account: 
either one can present the character of the “world of the defense,” the 
world within which God is justified in permitting the suffering. We might 
add that from this standpoint it makes no difference whether the fictional 
elements are present in the original story or are added by an interpreter. 
But it is hardly feasible to leave it at that. Stump herself clearly wants 
more than this: she devotes considerable effort to justifying her readings 
and defending them against rival interpretations. And readers of the Bible 
will hardly be able to consider her versions of the narratives without ask-
ing themselves how well they fit with the stories as they have come to 
know them. In view of this, I offer here a few thoughts concerning her 
discussions of Samson and Job.
It’s clear that many of the judgments Stump makes about the Samson 
story come from outside “the world of the story.” She censures severely 
Samson’s relationships with women; not without reason, to be sure. But the 
text records no judgment on this, except to say that the Lord was seeking 
an occasion against the Philistines. If one’s objective is to pick a fight, some 
provocative actions may be called for, and Samson was always happy to 
oblige! Later on, Samson’s stunt with the city gates of Gaza strikes Stump as 
hubristic. But the author,10 surely, is cheering him on, as have most readers 
ever since.
One of the interesting features of her treatment of the Samson narratives 
is her admiration for Milton’s Samson Agonistes. This is striking because, 
although both Milton and Stump empha size Samson’s ennoblement 
9I find her comments on the story of the anointing of Jesus in Luke 7:36–50 especially 
insightful (355–362). But there are many more examples.
10In referring to “the author” I am acceding to Stump’s plea that the narrative be consid-
ered as a unit; I am not taking a position concerning the literary history of the story. If in 
fact it was a composite effort on the part of many hands, “the author” will be taken to des-
ignate the final editor of this part of the canonical text.
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through suffering, their readings in other respects are very different. 
Stump is quite critical of Samson for his failure to make more progress in 
his struggle with the Philistines; Milton’s Samson, portrayed just before 
the end of his life, lays the blame for this on the Israelites who failed to rally 
in support. Indeed, he apparently finds nothing of major significance to 
repent of but his betrayal of the divine secret to Delilah. For Stump, in con-
trast, there was no secret to be betrayed, and what Samson told Delilah—
that the secret of his strength was in his long, uncut hair—was believed by 
him to be false, and was in fact false, though in an odd way it came to be 
true as a result of his telling her!
The turning point of the story, of course, lies precisely in that revelation, 
and it is not easy to give a psychologically plausible account of the episode. 
Samson had abundant evidence, based on his previous experience with 
Delilah, that she would use the information to betray him, so why would 
he make such a disclosure? Perhaps we can only say that he was weak, and 
was sexually obsessed with Delilah, and she eventually wore him down. 
It may be, also, that he irrationally believed, or half-believed, that God 
would deliver him whatever he told Delilah, and whatever she might do in 
consequence. Stump’s account, however, is different. On her view it simply 
was not true, and was not believed by Samson to be true, that his strength 
depended on his hair. His telling Delilah that was simply another in the 
series of untruths with which he strung her along as she badgered him 
for the secret of his strength. But in telling her what he did, knowing that 
her reaction would be to cut off his hair, Samson showed contempt for his 
Nazirite status, the thing that set him apart as a special servant of God. 
Samson was therefore contumacious towards God, and God deserted 
him as a result. This was not, however, a punishment as such, but rather 
a means of securing Samson’s repentance and restoration, which came 
about as a result of his terrible suffering at the hands of the Philistines.
This is certainly ingenious—too ingenious, I think, to be the intended 
point of the Samson narrative, which on the whole is quite straightforward. 
Virtually every reader of the story receives the impression that Samson’s 
might did depend on his hair—not perhaps directly, as the result of a quasi-
magical causality, but rather as a condition of God’s granting to Samson his 
remarkable strength. It seems clear that the reference to the regrowth of his 
hair in captivity is meant to signal also the return of his strength. (Much 
of the strength must indeed have returned, in order for Samson to be able 
to perform his feats for the entertainment of the Philistine nobles. His final 
act in pulling down the palace was a different matter, for which he needed 
to ask God’s extraordinary assistance.) If Samson believed his “revelation” 
to Delilah was false, why the emphasis in the text on his extreme reluc-
tance, and the lengths to which she had to go in persuading him? (Note 
Judges 16:17: “And he told her all his mind, and said to her, ‘A razor has never 
come upon my head, for I have been a Nazirite from my mother’s womb. If 
I be shaved, then my strength will leave me, and I shall become weak, and 
be like any other man.’”)
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The final episode of the story also merits attention. According to 
Stump, “He is great at the end of the story but not because he kills many 
of his enemies; his renewed strength and victory over the Philistines are 
by themselves hardly anything admirable in him. . . . In his praying to 
God as he does then, and in the drawing-near to God that his prayer ex-
presses, there is the culmination of the best in him. He is most glorious 
in the hopeful openness with which he makes his prayer and waits for 
God to flood him with strength” (255). The near-exclusive emphasis here 
on Samson’s improved state vis-à-vis God, and the minimizing of the im-
portance of his triumph over the Philistines, is contrary to the impression 
received by most readers—and, I would argue, it is contrary to the view 
taken by Milton, and by the text’s author.11 To be sure, Stump may not 
herself greatly admire the sort of achievement involved in slaughtering 
some three thousand members of an “enemy” society with a single deed. 
But there may be another motive at work here as well. If Samson’s great-
ness, and the justification of his suffering, depended in large part on his 
stupendous victory, a theodicy based on the story would have at most 
extremely limited application; most of us just are not in a position to do 
anything comparably spectacular.
Stump’s treatment of Job is at least equally problematic. One indication 
that something is amiss is found in her complete neglect of one of the ma-
jor themes of the book—the ancient version of the “prosperity gospel.”12 
According to this doctrine, those who live righteously and serve the Lord 
will without fail prosper, and things will go well for them. The corollary, 
11In my Bible, the account of Samson’s prayer occupies six lines; the account of his deed 
is twelve lines long, culminating with the triumphant words, “So the dead whom he slew 
at his death were more than those whom he had slain during his life” (Judges 16:30). As for 
Milton, the answer must be found in these lines of Manoah:
Come, Come; no time for lamentation now,
Nor much more cause. Samson hath quit himself
Like Samson, and heroicly hath finished
A life heroic, on his enemies
Fully revenged—hath left them years of mourning,
And lamentation to the sons of Caphtor
Through all Philistian bounds; to Israel
Honour hath left and freedom, let but them
Find courage to lay hold on this occasion;
To himself and father’s house eternal fame;
And which is best and happiest yet, all this
With God not parted from him, as was feared
But favouring and assisting to the end. (lines 1708–1720)
Even in the final lines, where Samson’s relationship with God comes into view, the empha-
sis is on God’s renewed favor as shown in assisting Samson in his triumph over the Philistines.
12Stump says that her interpretation “looks at only some parts of the book of Job, post-
poning or leaving aside entirely consideration of other parts” (181). I doubt, however, that 
her reading can afford to ignore such an absolutely central theme of the book.
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of course, is that anyone who suffers calamity is being punished for sin 
and faithlessness. This is what motivates Job’s friends in their increas-
ingly strident criticism of him. It is wrong to say, as Stump does, that the 
comforters “abandon any objective standard of goodness in the interest 
of being on the side of the ruler of the universe” (217). The comforters are 
overwhelmingly concerned to affirm and defend God’s goodness, in par-
ticular his justice. That is why they are outraged at Job’s persistent denial 
that he has done anything worthy of such suffering—that is, at his denial 
that God’s treatment of him is just. They are mistaken, of course, but their 
mistake is not aptly characterized as one of siding with sheer power and 
abandoning goodness.
Many readers (and most commentators) receive the impression that Job 
never receives an explanation of the reason for his suffering. Stump dis-
agrees: he does receive such an explana tion, precisely in God’s description 
of his relationship with his creatures. This relationship is parental; more 
precisely, it is maternal. “The imagery in [Job 38:8–11] depicts God’s deal-
ings with the sea as maternal interactions between God and the sea. The 
sea is created by coming forth from a womb, and God deals with the sea as 
a mother deals with her child: he wraps it in swaddling bands; he clothes it 
with a garment” (188). “‘Does the rain have a father?,’ God asks Job. ‘Who 
sired the dew drops? From whose womb comes the ice[?] The hoarfrost of 
heaven, who bore it . . .’ (Job 38:28–29)” (189). The ostrich “is portrayed as 
an inept and foolish mother, deprived of wisdom by God. . . . There is an 
implication that, if the ostrich’s eggs and children survive, this is because 
God does the mother’s job for the ostrich mother” (189). The payoff for this 
reading of the speeches is described by Stump as follows:
On one common moral intuition, a good parent will sometimes allow the 
children she loves to suffer—but only in case the suffering confers an out-
weighing benefit on the child who experiences the suffering, and confers 
this benefit on him in some way that could not have been equally well 
achieved without the suffering. . . . Nothing in the divine speeches sug-
gests that, when God considers what to do about the hunger of the baby 
birds, he thinks primarily about what might be a good thing for the cats in 
their neighborhood. God does not think about abandoning the baby birds 
in their need and weakness in order to benefit some other part of the cre-
ation. . . . Rather, he considers what will be good for them, and so he feeds 
them when they cry to him. (191)
Stump continues, “Nothing in God’s speeches to Job specifically describes 
God’s relations with human beings, of course, but there is certainly a ready 
inference—both for Job and for the audience of the book—from the way God 
deals with the rest of his creation to the way in which he deals with human 
persons. . . . The inference to this explanation about suffering is available to 
Job” (191). So Job was after all told the reason for his suffering: not the de-
tailed reason, of course, but he has been told that the suffering will be good 
for him, will secure for him some commensurately great benefit that could 
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not otherwise be obtained.13 (That benefit, according to Stump, consisted in 
the transcendent greatness—the “gloriousness”—that came to Job as a result 
of his faithfulness and integrity in the face of his intense suffering.)
Thus interpreted, the speech to Job contains an anticipation of Stump’s 
overall defense or theodicy. What is even more striking, it seems to com-
mit her to applying that theodicy both to animals and to human children, 
something she has declined to do in her official statements. (She has stat-
ed that she is addressing only the suffering of “adult human beings who 
are mentally fully functional” [4].) Perhaps mindful of this, she later on 
includes a note of caution: “Although . . . God portrays himself, in general, 
as concerned with the welfare of each of the animals directly, there are 
occasional notes that may seem to undermine that general picture. . . . 
God says he hunts the prey for the lions. But then the prey seems simply 
instrumental to the well-being of the lions” (568n). It seems to me, how-
ever, that it is too late for such caution. If God permits animals to suffer 
in a way that may not be conducive to their individual well-being (for in-
stance, by becoming a lion’s breakfast), then Job has not after all been told 
the reason for his suffering, as Stump has argued at some length.
But what shall we make of Stump’s interpretation? Frankly, I find little 
in the text that supports the use she makes of it. (And of a number of 
commentaries I’ve consulted, I find none that supports her reading.14) It’s 
true that Job does not know the source of the rain, dew, and frost, but that 
does not mean that God is himself the father of the rain or that God has a 
womb from which the ice came forth. The young ravens cry to God, but 
some of them starve to death all the same; when they don’t, their survival 
is because of the death of the prey brought to them by their parents—by 
their raven parents, that is, not by God. Some ostrich eggs are crushed, 
though enough survive that we don’t run out of ostriches. (If the eggs 
were going to be safe anyway, it wouldn’t be foolish for the mother ostrich 
to neglect them.) And these facts about the seamier side of nature would 
have been well known to Job. I am afraid, then, that we have to classify 
Stump’s use of these passages as a case of eisegesis.
Yet another remarkable feature of Stump’s treatment is her account of 
God’s conversa tions with Satan. The first thing to notice here is the amount 
of attention they receive. In my Bible the two conversations, which occur 
in the first two chapters of the book, occupy together just over one column 
out of 78—about 1.5 percent of the entire text. In Stump’s 50-page chapter, 
a little more than twelve and a half pages are devoted to these episodes—a 
bit over 25 percent of the whole! Even viewed in the light of her statement 
13These conclusions are not, of course, stated in the text, they are (it is claimed) shown 
in the relationship between God and the creatures, as depicted in God’s response to Job.
14Her foil throughout is the Anchor Bible commentary on Job, in which she finds little 
of merit. But none of a more or less random selection of commentaries I have consulted 
(including Francis I. Andersen, John E. Hartley, E. P. Hoevenor, G. Gerald Janzen, Keil and 
Delitzsch, The Interpreter’s Bible, and The New Interpreter’s Bible) supports Stump’s interpre-
tation.
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that some parts of the book are being passed over, this seems dispropor-
tionate. Why, we are led to ask, this extreme emphasis on what seems only 
a minor aspect of the entire text?
The answer is that part of what is seen in these episodes is God’s pa-
rental care and concern for Satan himself! They reveal the hope on God’s 
part that Satan may come to ack now ledge the genuine goodness of Job, an 
exemplary servant of God; by doing this, Satan would abandon or at least 
modify his cynical attitude towards God’s governance of the world, and 
would come a step closer to the reconciliation with God that God desires. 
Stump acknowledges that many would hold, on theological grounds, that 
Satan is beyond all hope of redemption; however she questions whether 
this is true “in the world of the story.” But even if Satan’s redemption is 
impossible, he may perhaps be kept from becom ing even more alienated; 
anyway, a perfect love such as God’s would not abandon a wayward child 
even if God is aware that genuine reconciliation is not within reach.
Frankly, I find so little in the text to support Stump’s over-ingenious 
reading that I don’t think a detailed rebuttal is called for. (And once again, 
the commentators offer her no support.) The reasonable view to take, I 
think, is that the episodes involving Satan have the function of providing 
a context for the sufferings of Job that are the main theme of the book. If 
God’s relationship with Satan as such were a major concern, it is incred-
ible that there would be no mention of Satan in the book’s conclusion. 
Unless, that is, the failure to mention him indicates that God’s hopes for 
him were dashed. But in that case the book of Job would be in part about 
the failure of God’s good intentions concerning Satan—and that, I submit, 
is about as untenable as any interpretation could be.
We have to wonder, at this point, about the reason behind Stump’s pre-
occupation with these apparently minor episodes. Of course the notion that 
even Satan may not be beyond the possibility of redemption has attractions 
of its own; attractions, however, that are most readily appreciated in the 
context of a universalist narrative that Stump does not endorse. But there is 
another reason in this case: the episodes as she interprets them provide cru-
cial evidence supporting what she terms the “fractal character” of the book 
of Job. A fractal pattern, as this is understood in mathematics, is one that 
is scale-invariant. A fractal such as the Mandelbrot set is such that “when 
any detail of the whole graph is enlarged, its graph closely resembles the 
graph of the whole but is not identical to it” (220–221). Fractal patterns can 
be discerned in nature to some extent; for example, the distribution of per-
turbations in the cosmic background radiation is said to be fractal, or scale-
invariant. And it has been claimed that the apparently random drips in the 
paintings of Jackson Pollock also exhibit a fractal pattern.
As applied to the book of Job, the fractal pattern amounts to this: God’s 
loving concern for Job, which includes a willingness to see him suffer for 
his own greater good, is mirrored in the lives of each of the other persons 
mentioned. We don’t see how this works in the case of Job’s original chil-
dren: how was it to their benefit to be killed by the wind that collapsed 
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the house in which they were partying? We shouldn’t expect to see this, 
however; it is not their story that is being told. But for the fractal analysis 
to carry conviction there has to be someone in the book other than Job 
himself to whom the principles of the theodicy can be seen to apply. And 
the best candidate for this “someone” is, of course, Satan:
Insofar as the details of God’s dealings with Job and also their outcome is 
very similar but not identical to the details and outcome of God’s dealings 
with Satan or with the non-human animals and the other parts of creation, 
the book of Job seems to me the second-person analogue of a Mandelbrot 
set. (221)
The notion that the book has this sort of fractal character is certainly an 
attractive one. But the only substantial evidence in its favor is found in the 
episodes exhibiting God’s relation ship with Satan, and the interpretation of 
those episodes we have been given just doesn’t stand up. I am afraid, there-
fore, that the source of the fractal pattern must be found in Stump herself.
I have been critical especially of Stump’s treatment of Job, but it is im-
portant to say here that her account of Job as well as of her other pro-
tagonists contains much that is insightful and valuable, especially in her 
depiction of the redemptive value of Job’s second-person encounter with 
God. There are, I think, flaws in the interpretation, but the flaws by no 
means negate the value of the whole.
IV. Theodicy/Defense
The final section of the book consists of three chapters. In the first, she 
sets forth the Thomistic theodicy that is the heart of her project, and de-
fends it against certain objections. In the second, she addresses a topic not 
considered by Aquinas: suffering that results from depriva tion of “desires 
of the heart,” things upon which a person’s heart is set that are not es-
sential to the person’s ultimate flourishing, understood as “shared union 
with God.” (This is one of the best and most interesting chapters in the 
book, though it also poses problems for the theodicy. Unfortunately, I will 
not be able to pursue this fascinating topic further in this essay.) Having 
shown to her own satisfaction how the Thomistic theodicy can be en-
hanced so as to account for such suffering, she completes her defense of it 
in the final chapter; she defends it, however, not as a theodicy but rather 
as a defense, in the sense discussed earlier.15
Stump’s proposal draws upon the portrayals in the biblical narratives 
of the preceding section:
15I am not entirely clear about Stump’s reasons for preferring defense to theodicy. We 
might suppose that it is because nonbelievers cannot be expected to accept the positive 
theo lo gical claims made in a theodicy. But this would be a bad reason: all sensible theo-
dicists realize that their task is one of warding off objections and that theodicy as such is 
not expected to provide positive grounds for belief. The only other substantive advantage I 
can think of lies in the lesser epistemic requirements for a defense as she understands it. I 
believe, however, that these lowered epistemic requirements constitute a weakness rather 
than a strength of her project of defense.
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[T]ogether, Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary give us an iconic represen-
tation of the panoply of human suffering. The physical pain and mental 
agony of an innocent victim are pictured in the story of Job. The self-de-
struction of human evil is evident in the story of Samson. The heartsickness 
whose source is the deprivation of a heart’s desire is portrayed in the story 
of Abraham. And the misery of being unwanted, shamed, and heartbroken 
is shown in the story of Mary. . . . All the modes of suffering are here, even if 
many of the species are missing. (373)
These stories could be used as examples to illustrate premises in her argu-
ments about suffering, but Stump objects that “to use the stories in this 
way is to wreck them as stories” (372). She prefers to regard them as a 
fund of shared experience between author and readers, as a way of ac-
cessing the “Franciscan knowledge” that the stories (it is hoped) will have 
communicated.
Before engaging the central claims of Stump’s defense, it is necessary 
to note certain limitations in the scope both of the defense and of the 
Thomistic theodicy on which it is based. The defense does not attempt 
to provide a justification for suffering which is entirely voluntary, nor for 
suffering which is justly imposed as a punishment for wrongdoing; in 
neither case is any further justification called for. (One might suppose that 
this excludes Samson from her purview, but she thinks not: “Even if we 
grant . . . that Samson is guilty of serious moral wrongdoing . . . the ruin 
of Samson’s life seems out of all proportion to that wrongdoing” [380].)
There is, however, a further limitation: the theodicy applies only to 
the sufferings of “mentally fully functional adult human beings”; ex-
cluded, then, are the sufferings of animals, of children, and of mentally 
impaired adults. One might suppose that the fundamental principle, that 
all suffering is ultimately to the benefit of the sufferer, applies in those 
cases also, the difficulty being that we have less grasp of the sorts of 
experiences possible for children, impaired adults, and animals. Those 
difficulties do play a role here, but Stump is unwilling to commit herself 
even to the basic principle: “There is no guarantee that one and only one 
explanation of suffering applies to all the kinds of sufferings there are in 
the world” (379).
I think this limitation is problematic for her. For one thing, it may strike 
us as strange for someone to write a 650-page book on the problem of suf-
fering, and yet exclude from considera tion what may well be some of the 
most difficult cases. (Are we to expect another 650, or 1300, pages that will 
address those missing cases?) Furthermore, it is hard to see how the moral 
principles which drove Stump to accept the basic principle as applied to 
normal adults will allow her to make exceptions in the case of children 
and impaired persons. We saw in her treatment of Job that an important 
role is played by the intuition that “a good parent will sometimes allow 
the children she loves to suffer—but only in case the suffering confers 
an outweighing benefit on the child who experiences the suffering, and 
confers this benefit on him in some way that could not have been equally 
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well achieved without the suffering.” Would it not be strange, then, for 
her to hold that God is not bound by this principle in his own treatment 
of human children?
At this point, however, we need to address the central claims of the 
theodicy, with respect to those cases in which it applies. These claims are 
formulated by Stump in terms of a series of ques tions, all of which must 
receive an affirmative answer for the theodicy to succeed. The two ques-
tions that are germane for the present discussion are initially stated as 
follows:16
(C a1) Does God’s allowing a person’s suffering enable her to flourish?
(C a2) Is a person’s suffering the best available means, in the circum-
stances, for her to flourish? (456)
These questions, however, need to be reformulated in terms of Aquinas’s 
scale of values, according to which human flourishing consists ultimately 
in “shared union with God.” So reformulated, we have
(C A1) Does God’s allowing a person’s suffering enable her to be will-
ing to let God be close to her?
(C A2) Is a person’s suffering the best available means, in the circum-
stances, to enable her to be willing to let God be close to her? 
(456)
Let me say here that I don’t think we should forget entirely the first ver-
sion of the questions. It may be true that shared union with God is the 
most important thing, but it would distort our view of human life if we 
were to ignore all the other things that are ingredients in what we nor-
mally consider to be a person’s flourishing. (Stump’s actual procedure is 
consistent with this; she does consider goods other than union with God.) 
The “best available means” language also calls for comment. The “best 
available means” are those means which, in the light of the existing cir-
cumstances, are most likely to bring about the desired result, given that 
the actual results, which depend on the free response of the sufferer, can-
not be known prior to the decision to employ those means. The purpose, 
then, of the “best means” language, and also that of the word “enable,” is 
to allow for cases in which, due to the free will of the sufferer, the good 
results God intends in allowing the suffering do not in fact come about. 
Now for determinists and Molinists, who hold that God knows, prior to 
his decision to allow the suffering, exactly what the results will be, the 
issue of “best available means” (in this sense) arguably does not arise. 
God in permitting the suffering is choosing to bring about precisely those 
results which will actually ensue. But with Stump’s open-theist-like view 
of providence, God does not know this prior to his decision to allow the 
16In addition to the two questions discussed here, there are two more dealing with the 
“desires of the heart.” As noted above, this topic will not be addressed in this essay.
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suffering,17 so all that can be expected is that God should choose the best 
available means to the desired result.
Stump holds that these questions can and should receive an affirma-
tive answer. I believe there are serious problems for her position, both of 
a broadly empirical and of a conceptual nature. She makes an attempt to 
address both sorts of problems, but not, I think, successfully. First, the em-
pirical problem. Let me say at the outset that I accept completely that suf-
fering can, and sometimes does in fact, have the sorts of beneficial results 
she contemplates. The problem, as I see it, consists in the many, many 
cases in which no such results are evident—in which it seems that the 
actual results are quite the opposite. In order to highlight this problem, I 
think a further reformulation is called for, one that brings out more force-
fully the universality of what is being claimed:
(C A1)* Does God’s allowing a person’s suffering in every case enable 
her to be willing to let God be close to her?
(C A2)* Is a person’s suffering in every case the best available means, 
in the circumstances, to enable her to be willing to let God be 
close to her?
In support of affirmative answers to (C A1) and (C A2), Stump cites 
scientific studies concerning “post-traumatic growth,” in which various 
researchers have verified empirically that extreme trauma does in fact 
produce unexpected personal growth, including growth in religious and 
spiritual awareness. This research is impressive, and provides valuable 
backup for the anecdotal evidence for the same conclusion. The research, 
however, supports affirmative answers to what we might term the exis-
tentially quantified versions of (C A1) and (C A2); it does little to vindicate 
the universally quantified versions needed by the theodicy. The real dif-
ficulty, then, concerns the all-too-numerous cases in which no result of the 
desired sort can be seen to occur—rather, the sufferer becomes embittered, 
or unable to function, or perhaps just limps through life in what appears to 
be a permanently compromised condition. The scientific data are far from 
providing unambiguous support for Stump’s position. A major concern 
stemming from the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is the number of 
return ing veterans who suffer from untreated, or inadequately treated, post-
traumatic stress disorder. Mental health professionals who are concerned 
about this do not suppose that the solution lies in waiting for the expected 
post-traumatic growth to become manifest! The point concerning “best 
possible means” provides only limited help. In very many cases, surely, 
it is highly predictable that severe suffering is unlikely to produce positive 
results.18 At this point I will make my appeal to one of my own favorite 
17What is at issue here is, of course, priority in the order of explanation, not temporal 
priority, which for a timeless God cannot exist.
18The emphasis on the free will of the sufferer as the explanation for an unfavorable 
result has a downside of its own: it implies that, when suffering fails to have a beneficial 
effect, this is invariably the sufferer’s own fault.
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theodicists, Austin Farrer, who wrote, “Good, even animal good, such as 
physical health or a moderate plenty, is a more fertile breeder of good on the 
whole—yes, even of moral good—than evil of any kind can be.”19
At this point Stump is likely to say—in fact, she does say—that “neither 
suffering nor the benefits defeating suffering are trans parent” (413), so 
that in many cases the apparent lack of beneficial results from suffering 
may be only apparent, and misleading to us who do not know the secret 
recesses of the heart. The point is well taken, but it cuts both ways. It may 
also be the case that some who appear to us to have coped reasonably well 
are in fact deeply embittered, or have lost all hope, even though they are 
able to maintain a plausible front to others. Our lack of insight into the 
hearts of people should make us cautious in judging individual cases, but 
it has no tendency to show that things overall are better rather than worse 
than they appear to us to be.20
The sorts of claims made by Stump may seem hard to refute when we 
consider individual cases of suffering that come to people from time to 
time. It may be, we think, that for some special reason, unknown to us, 
these particular persons are especially suited to deal with such trials and 
to benefit from them—at least, it is difficult to prove otherwise. The situa-
tion becomes far more grave, however, when we consider natural or man-
made disasters which suddenly and in an undiscriminating fashion bring 
great suffering upon nearly every individual in an affected area. Are we to 
suppose, in such cases, that for every such individual there is a particular 
reason why he or she was selected for such suffering? It must be the case 
that each one of them, without exception, would benefit at least as much 
from this disaster as from anything else that could have happened to 
them. And if this is so for each of them, then presumably it is so for each of 
us as well. (I scarcely think Stump would want to say that catastrophes oc-
cur because they are particularly appropriate to the needs of the persons 
in the affected area.)21 Occur rences bringing sudden death22 on a massive 
scale (such as the recent tsunami in Japan) must also be considered. If all 
such deaths are beneficial to those who perish, it must be the case that, 
for nearly all of us nearly all of the time, sudden death with little or no 
time for preparation would be more conducive to a happy afterlife than 
would whatever years of life might remain to us in the absence of such a 
disaster.23 And that is a hard doctrine to swallow. I believe therefore, that, 
19Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (London: Collins, 1962), 167.
20Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1998), 27–28.
21Paul Reasoner has pointed out to me that the same problem arises in relation to doc-
trines of karma; it is implausible to suppose that the same karmic outcomes are appropriate 
to each of a large, randomly selected group of individuals.
22Death also, even painless death, counts as suffering on Stump’s extended notion of 
suffering; see p. 5.
23Hamlet (Act III, Scene IV) decided not to kill the murderer of his father while the man 
was at prayer, lest he do the villain a favor by sending him to heaven with his soul purged 
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evaluating the claims made in Stump’s defense in terms of van Inwagen’s 
requirements for a successful defense, we have good reason to think the de-
fense is false. If Stump should reply that I have not demon strated that it is 
false based on uncontested empirical evidence, I will readily agree. But I 
will add this: if she thinks that is good enough, she is too easily satisfied.
The conceptual problem is at least equally serious. Stump introduces 
this by saying, “someone might complain that on Aquinas’s views we 
ought never to try to alleviate suffering since to alleviate suffering would 
also be to prevent the benefit brought about by the suffering” (412).24 She 
responds that “one person Paula’s allowing some suffering on the part 
of another person Jerome that Paula could readily prevent or relieve is 
morally permissible only if Paula is justified in holding the true belief 
that suffering is the best means in the circumstances for drawing Jerome 
closer to God in the process of justification or sanctification” (413).25 But 
human beings are very rarely in a position to know anything like this. 
Stump notes, however, that “The putative objector might rejoin here that 
the possession of a Thomistic theodicy in effect pro vides what one might 
otherwise not have—namely, the basis for concluding that any particular 
suffer ing will in fact serve the purpose of justification and sanctification. 
. . . And so . . . a Thomistic theodicy provides what I have just claimed hu-
man beings rarely have: moral justification for permitting the suffering of 
others” (413). She replies,
But this rejoinder is also confused. On Aquinas’s theodicy, any particular 
suffering allowed by God will benefit others in the way the theodicy explains. 
But when Paula considers whether she ought to try to prevent or relieve Je-
rome’s suffering, she cannot know whether the future suffering of Jerome 
that she is considering is suffering that God will allow. That is because, if 
Paula does not do what she can to alleviate that future suffering of Jerome’s, 
someone else might do so. (413)
Two comments are in order here. First of all, there are plenty of circum-
stances in which we have good reason to believe that, if we fail to act or 
prevent or alleviate suffering, no one else will do so. The women who, in 
the nineteenth century, were denied anesthesia because Provi dence had 
ordained that childbirth should be painful (Stump’s example) were not 
of guilt. In truth, the prospects for Hamlet’s revenge were worse than he feared: whenever 
he might slay his enemy, he will make the man’s chances of escaping damnation better than 
had he en joyed more years of life. This is bad news for those intent on murderous revenge, 
but bad news also for all of us, whose lives on this view represent mainly a relentless down-
ward spiral of spiritual decline.
24Stump attributes this objection to me, referencing The Triumph of God Over Evil, 189–191. 
I do not, however, affirm the objection precisely in the way she formulates it, nor do I agree 
with some of the other views she attributes to her objector. Conclusions about my views 
need to be formed on the basis of what is actually said in my book, as well as in this essay.
25Surely this cannot be true; it’s obvious, as I think Stump would admit, that other ben-
efits (such as restoring Jerome to health) might justify Paula’s permitting his suffering (for 
instance, if she has medical power of attorney and can decide whether or not to permit seri-
ous and painful surgery to be performed on him).
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relieved of their pains in some other way. Very often, those who suffer from 
natural disasters simply will not be helped, if we don’t help them. And 
there are many situations of this sort. But second, if Paula does not prevent 
Jerome’s suffering but someone else does, then Paula will not have permit-
ted Jerome to suffer at all. In fact, from the standpoint of Jerome’s welfare, 
Paula’s decision not to intervene is a “fail-safe” option: if the suffering does 
occur, it will be because it is the best possible means to Jerome’s ultimate 
welfare; otherwise, he simply will not suffer. I am not claiming that it would 
be morally wrong for Paula to intervene, but it is impossible to deny that if 
she does intervene, this will not enhance Jerome’s ultimate welfare and may very 
well detract from it. If she knows that Aquinas’s theodicy is true, she knows 
this as well; it follows, that if she nevertheless ought to intervene, the reason 
she ought to do so has nothing to do with Jerome’s welfare.
This does not, of course, entail that Paula ought not to care about Jerome’s 
suffering. It is right and appropriate that she should care deeply about it, 
but her caring may not and should not be the sole determinant of what she 
should do. She will be in a situation comparable to one discussed several 
times by Stump: a parent has a sick child, and the best chances of recovery 
lie in a treatment which will be excruciatingly painful for the child. If she 
does not allow the treatment, the child may not recover from the illness, 
but if she does allow it, she will suffer along with (and perhaps even more 
than) the child. I submit that it is intolerable to suppose that we are always 
or nearly always in such a situation when we contemplate the opportunity 
to relieve or prevent serious suffering on the part of others. To suppose this 
creates a certain sort of conceptual incoherence in a religious worldview 
that urges us to be ready in our response to those who are suffering, yet 
also informs us that if we prevent or relieve their suffering we are very 
likely harming their most important interests.26
In a hedonistic society such as ours, it takes courage as well as wisdom 
and resource to write a book extolling the redemptive benefits of suffer-
ing. Stump has performed this daunting task with great distinction. I’ve 
argued that some of her claims cannot be sustained, but this in no way 
negates the value of the materials she has assembled. The book ought to 
be read by everyone with an interest in the topic; it may even bring light 
to some who wander in darkness (and that is many of us, at one time or 
another). I do not think we can learn from her the solution to the problem 
of suffering. But that may be because a solution of the kind she is looking 
for is simply not available.27
Huntington University
26Ironically, the objection to Stump’s theodicy at this point parallels a very similar ob-
jection to the skeptical theist position: skeptical theists are obliged to hold that we have no 
knowledge whatsoever, with respect to any particular action we may choose to perform, 
whether that action is likely to make the world better or worse overall. See my “All Too 
Skeptical Theism,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 68 (2010), 15–29.
27My thanks to Thomas Flint, Paul Reasoner, and Charles Taliaferro for valuable com-
ments on an earlier version of this material.
